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ABSTRACT 
 
In February 2014, Singapore embarked on a 2-year trial of a Bus Service Reliability 
Framework (BSRF) to improve en-route bus regularity and reduce instances of bus 
EXQFKLQJDQGSURORQJHGZDLWLQJWLPHV%DVHGRQ/RQGRQ¶V4XDOLW\,QFHQWLYH
Contract, the Singapore model also imposes penalties or provides incentives to 
operators for increases/reductions of Excess Wait Time (EWT) beyond a certain 
route-specific baseline.  
 
Drawing on insights derived from research on performance-based contracts, this 
paper describes some key considerations surrounding this particular innovation in 
6LQJDSRUH¶VRverall bus regulatory framework. We also discuss an important 
advancement in our understanding of how bus users value reliability improvements 
through estimates obtained from stated preference data. At the same time, early 
indications from the trial have been encouraging. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
For many public transport users, service reliability is a key attribute of the travel 
experience. The importance of reliability is amply demonstrated by the multitude of 
papers concluding that variability in travel time impacts well-being more negatively 
than the actual journey time itself (see review by Carrion & Levinson, 2012). With 
regards to the bus in particular, an unreliable bus service, characterised by unequal 
headways or bus bunching for high frequency services, can lead to longer waiting 
time and travel time for bus passengers. Moreover, in cases where passenger 
loading on a particular bus route is already high, unequal arrival times can mean 
severe crowding on the first bus that arrives after a long headway. The generally 
unpleasant in-vehicle experience adds another layer of frustration to passengers who 
have already endured a longer than expected wait, if they are not denied boarding in 
the first place. Unreliability begets further unreliability as dwell times increase at bus 
stops to cater for the higher passenger movements on and off the bus. 
 
This paper GHVFULEHV6LQJDSRUH¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKLPSURYLQJEXVVHUYLFHUHOLDELOLW\
Section 2 provides a review of reliability measures and how reliability is achieved in 
various jurisdictions worldwide. Section 3 briefly describes 6LQJDSRUH¶s bus industry 
EHIRUHGLVFXVVLQJ6LQJDSRUH¶VWULDORILWV%XV6HUYLFH5HOLDELOLW\)UDPHZRUN%65)
Section 4 is largely an empirical section which discusses commuter awareness of the 
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BSRF, stated preference strategies to measure improvement in reliability and 
crowding, and outcomes to date. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of Reliability Measures Used Worldwide 
 
Recognising the centrality of this aspect of service quality in passenger experience, 
industry regulators around the world have introduced various service reliability 
frameworks in their performance monitoring regimes. TriMet in Portland, Oregon, 
uses the Bus Dispatching System (BDS) to monitor public transport reliability (Feng & 
Figliozzi, 2012). The BDS combines Automatic Vehicle Location and Automatic 
Passenger Counters data to provide detailed information on bus service 
performance. The two performance measures are headway deviation and actual 
headway spatial distribution. Headway deviation looks at the difference between 
actual headway and scheduled headway. Actual headway spatial distribution depicts 
the proportion of actual headways deviating from scheduled headway against 
different stops along the route. Spikes and dips on the distribution would suggest 
congestion or chokepoints that require improvements. Strathman et al. (2000) report 
that the BDS has decreased bus service running time by 3 percent after 
implementation.  
 
In Shanghai and Jiangyin City, a normalised average headway index is used to 
determine the actual headway deviation from the scheduled headway (Guo, Luo, Lin 
& Feng, 2011). An index below 100% indicates that the bus is earlier than scheduled, 
while an index above 100% indicates that the bus is behind schedule (Eq. (1)).  
 
 
(1) 
   
where: ܪ௜  = average headway of normalised i-th bus stop; 
  ܪఋ = the departure interval at departure station of two specific adjacent  
   bus deployments;  ܪఋ௜ = headway of the two specific adjacent bus deployments at i-th bus      
   stop; 
 n    = number of bus deployments. 
 
,Q&KDQJ]KRX¶V%XV5DSLG7UDQVLWIRXUPHDVXUHVDUHXVHG as indicators of reliability 
(Huo, Zhao, Li, & Hu, 2014). One statistic used is the coefficient of variation of 
headway, which is the standard deviation of headway divided by its mean. It 
indicates service reliability from the RSHUDWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHOn the other hand, 
potential waiting time, equivalent waiting time and reliability buffer time indicate 
service reliability from WKHXVHUV¶ perspective. Potential waiting time refers to the 
difference between 95th percentile waiting time and mean waiting time. Equivalent 
waiting time is the weighted sum of mean and potential waiting time. Reliability buffer 
time is the extra time that commuters need to provision beyond typical journey time 
to ensure on time arrival at destination with 95% probability. 
 
ܪ݅ ൌ ෍ ܪఋ௜ ܪఋൗ௡ଶ݊ െ  ? ൈ  ? ? ? ?
3 
 
In Chicago, the Automatic Vehicle Location data is used to determine running time 
adherence and headway regularity (Lin, Wang & Barnum, 2008). Running time 
adherence measures the average difference between actual and scheduled run 
times, while headway regularity measures the average difference between actual and 
scheduled headways. A high metric value for these two indicators will indicate 
irregular bus services and poor reliability (Eq. (2)).  
 
ܴݑ݊݊݅݊݃ܶ݅݉݁ܣ݄݀݁ݎ݁݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ෍ ቚܣܿݐݑ݈ܽܴݑ݊ܶ݅݉݁ െ ݄ܵܿ݁݀ݑ݈݁݀ܴݑ݊݄ܶ݅݉݁ܵܿ݁݀ݑ݈݁݀ܴݑ݊ܶ݅݉݁ ቚ௠ ݉ ൈ  ? ? ? ?
 (2) 
ܪ݁ܽ݀ݓܽݕܴ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݎ݅ݐݕ ൌ  ෍ ฬܣܿݐݑ݈ܽܪ݁ܽ݀ݓܽݕ െ ݄ܵܿ݁݀ݑ݈݁݀ܪ݁ܽ݀ݓܽݕ݄ܵܿ݁݀ݑ݈݁݀ܪ݁ܽ݀ݓܽݕ ฬ௡ ݊ ൈ  ? ? ? ?
 
In Sydney, Transport for New South Wales uses Key Performance Indicators to 
monitor bus services performance. It measures punctuality of buses at the 
commencement of trip, mid-point of trip and at the last transit stop, requiring at least 
95% of the trips to be between 2 min early and 6 min late. 
 
Transport for London (TfL) characterises London bus services depending on whether 
they are high or low frequency. The reliability of high frequency services, defined as 
those with headways of less than 15 minutes, is assessed based on average excess 
wait time (EWT) experienced by commuters. Unreliable bus services, as evidenced 
by irregular spacing of buses, will result in high EWT. On the other hand, low 
frequency services are assessed on percentage of buses departing on time 
according to bus schedules.  
 
2.2 Achieving Reliability through Performance Based Contracts 
 
How to meaningfully measure bus service reliability is one, but certainly not the only 
consideration that regulators need to address. Another important question involves 
mechanism design ± how one might achieve even better bus service reliability 
performance. Fortunately, on this latter issue, the existing literature offers substantial 
guidance, particularly through the use of performance-based contracts (PBCs). 
Based on the extensive research, PBCs are now used across manufacturing and 
service industries, in public and private domains (Selviaridis and Wynstra, 2014).  
 
In the realm of bus service provision in particular, Hensher and Houghton (2002) 
proposed a system that takes into account various external costs such as costs of 
congestion, among many others, with social surplus maximisation as the underlying 
motivation in order to ensure that bus operators deliver the optimal service level that 
is consistent with the needs of stakeholders, especially the government. Working 
along similar lines, Hensher and Stanley (2003) highlighted the importance of PBCs 
as a crucial factor that aligns commercial objectives with social objectives by 
rewarding operators for achieving a minimum level of service (MSL) and for an 
increase in ridership. Selviaridis and Wynstra (2014) also highlighted a form of PBCs 
where negative or positive incentives are given although WKHUHFDQDOVREHµGHDG
]RQHV¶IRUDFFHSWDEOHSHUIRUPDQFHOHYHOVIRUZKLFKWKHUHLVQHLWKHUSHQDOW\QRUH[WUD
rewards.  
 
A notable example of an implementation of PBCs in the provision of public bus 
service is the Hordaland framework (Larsen, 2001). In the Hordaland framework, 
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social benefits such as reduced waiting time, reduced number of transfers and 
WUDQVIHUVRIULGHUVIURPFDUWRSXEOLFWUDQVSRUWLVLQWHUQDOLVHGLQWRWKHRSHUDWRUV¶
remuneration contracts based on revenue kilometres and passengers The framework 
attempts to induce operators to deliver the socially optimal level of services through 
performance-based subsidies as part of the total payment per passenger received by 
operators (Hensher and Stanley, 2003).  
 
Numerous studies have also shown that reliability remains a crucial component of 
busVHUYLFHTXDOLW\GHOO¶2OLR,EHDVDQG&HFÕғQIRXQGWKDWEXVUHOLDELOLW\LVRQH
of the most important attribute alongside waiting time. They highlighted the need for 
transport companies to place greater emphasis on punctuality and headways 
EHWZHHQEXVHV1RWRQO\LVEXVUHOLDELOLW\DQLPSRUWDQWIDFWRULQGHWHUPLQLQJSHRSOH¶V
behaviour choices (Disney, 1999; König & Axhausen, 2002), it is also found to be a 
main reason behind XVHUV¶ dissatisfaction towards public bus services (Edvardsson, 
,QDGGLWLRQEXVUHOLDELOLW\PD\EHRIDGHFLVLYHIDFWRULQGHWHUPLQLQJSHRSOH¶V
tolerance level in other areas such as comfort and ventilation (Disney, 1999). 
Similarly, a key finding uncovered by Bates, Polak, Jones, and Cook (2001) shows 
that as travellers, users highly value punctuality. In order to improve service 
regularity, Cats (2014) highlighted the need to incorporate reliability measures such 
as regularity indicators into an incentive scheme.   
 
The incorporation of bus service reliability into a PBC regime for operators has been 
widely implemented around the world, such as in New Zealand and in London 
(Transport for London, 2015; Ian Wallis Associates Ltd & The TAS Partnership, 2013; 
Vincent, 2008). ,Q/RQGRQ¶VFDVHDn incentive mechanism embedded in its Quality 
Incentive Contract is used to encourage bus operators to provide reliable service, 
with a bonus of up to 15 percent or deduction of up to 10 percent of the contract price 
relative to the required standards. These standards are known as the Minimum 
Performance Standards (MPS) and DUHDFUXFLDOSDUWRI/RQGRQ¶VVFKHPHDVthey act 
as a reliability benchmark for operators. Operators are not paid for any mileage not 
operated IRUUHDVRQVZLWKLQWKHRSHUDWRU¶VFRQWUROVXFKDVVWDIIVKRUWDJHVRU
mechanical issues. Setting MPS properly is a very important part of the contracting 
process, as failure to could so could mean that bus operators would pass the risk of 
poor performance to the public authority by putting the anticipated penalty in the 
contract bid.   
 
Since the implementation of the Quality Incentive Contracts in 2001, EWT of high 
frequency services has fallen from 2.2 minutes to 1.0 minutes and the percentage of 
on-time low frequency services has risen from 68 percent to 83 percent in 2014 
(Transport for London, 2014). With greater service reliability, passengers are also 
able to time their arrival time to coincide with bus arrival time to reduce waiting time. 
TfL reports that service improvements are estimated to have accounted for some 30 
percent of the growth in demand for bus services from 1997 to 2012 (Transport for 
London, 2014). 
 
 
 
3. The Bus Service Reliability Framework (BSRF) in Singapore 
3.1 Overview RI6LQJDSRUH¶V%XV,QGXVWU\ 
 
Bus services in Singapore are primarily provided by two major bus operators, SBS 
Transit (SBST) and SMRT Corporation (SMRT). As of June 2015, both companies 
operated over 350 bus services, with an average total daily vehicle-kilometres 
travelled of 856,600 bus-km. Each bus operator has been assigned separate areas 
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of responsibility that correspond to satellite residential towns developed by 
government planning agencies. They operate a mixture of short intra-town routes 
FDOOHG³IHHGHUVHUYLFHV´DQGORQJHUURXWHVFDOOHG³WUXQNURXWHV´+DYLQJEHHQ
awarded the first bus package of public bus services under the new Bus Contracting 
Model (see Goh, Swee, & Low, 2015), Tower Transit became 6LQJDSRUH¶VWKLUGmajor 
bus operator as of May 2016. SBS Transit operates 247 bus routes, with a total route 
network of 5054 km, while SMRT Corporation operates 111 bus routes with a total 
route network of 2326 km. 
 
Before it was required to undertake a new advisory role on public transport matters, 
the Public Transport Council (PTC) oversaw regulation on, among other things, bus 
services and bus service operators. As part of its regulatory framework, the PTC 
established Quality of Service (QoS) standards, in particular Operating Performance 
Standards which measure minimum daily or monthly operational deliverables, 
covering aspects of bus reliability, loading and safety. On bus reliability standards, 
the PTC required operators to ensure that, on a daily basis, each service had at least 
85% of its trips depart the bus interchanges and terminals not more than 5 min from 
its scheduled headway. 
 
3.2 Overview of the Bus Service Reliability Framework (BSRF) 
 
,WKDVRIWHQEHHQSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKH37&¶Vregulatory stance failed to sufficiently 
DGGUHVVFRPPXWHUV¶FRQFHUQVDERXWUHOLDELOLW\DVWKHRQO\NH\SHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRU
measures reliability at origin and not en-route regularity. In 2014, the Land Transport 
Authority (LTA) decided to make en-route reliability an explicit service requirement by 
introducing the Bus Service Reliability Framework (BSRF) initially as a two-year trial 
for the two major bus operators (Land Transport Authority, 2014b, 2014a). In the first 
phase of the trial described in this paper, 22 bus services are covered, comprising a 
mixture of trunk and feeder services. The intention of the trial is to improve en-route 
bus regularity, reduce instances of bus bunching and reduce prolonged waiting times 
for bus users. 
 
Although the BSRF trial only covers a modest number of bus services, nevertheless, 
the LTA hopes that the trial will provide a better understanding of bus reliability 
improvements that could be made on different types of routeVDVZHOODVWKH%65)¶V
effectiveness to get bus operators to improve service reliability. A successful roll-out 
of the BSRF would complement other regulatory measures such as more strictly 
enforcing bus lanes and enhancing bus priority schemes and measures. With the 
Bus Contracting Model that is being introduced, the lessons learnt from the trial will 
also be valuable to LTA as it is now responsible for setting regulatory standards for 
the quality of bus services in the bus packages that are tendered out.  
 
Like London, Singapore also categorises bus services by high and low frequency. 
Low frequency services are those with the majority of headways being more than 15 
minutes where punctuality of bus arrivals is more important. High frequency services 
are buses that arrive at frequeQFLHVRIPLQXWHVRUOHVVZKHUHFRPPXWHUVFDQ³WXUQ
XSDQGJR´DQGJHQHUDOO\GRQRWUHIHUWRWKHWLPHWDEOHThe vast majority of basic bus 
services in Singapore are µKLJKIUHTXHQF\¶VHUYLFHV 
 
Following the TfL model, the BSRF assesses the regularity of a bus service using the 
concept of Excess Wait Time (EWT). EWT is the average additional wait time 
actually experienced by commuters at bus stops, compared to the expected wait time 
if the buses arrived at regular intervals. It is defined as the difference between the 
Actual Wait Time (AWT) and the Scheduled Wait Time (SWT), that is, EWT = AWT ʹ 
SWT, with AWT and SWT defined in Eq. (3).  
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The EWT methodology assumes uniform arrival rate of passengers and increases if 
there is bus bunching which results in prolonged waits for the subsequent bus. 
Conversely, it goes down if bus arrivals at each bus stop become more regular. As a 
result, commuters would experience greater ease in boarding as the passenger load 
is spread more evenly across the various bus trips. If a bus service arrives perfectly 
regularly, the EWT will be 0 min.  
 
The EWT explicitly quantifies the commuting experience using the excess time 
experienced by commuters due to variability of the bus services. This allows useful 
and direct comparisons across different bus routes and bus stops along the line. The 
EWT is an indicator of reliability IURPWKHFRPPXWHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHUDWKHU than the 
supply side perspective such as WKHRSHUDWRU¶VDELOLW\WRGLVSDWFKEXVHV on time 
(Oort, 2014). Moreover, the EWT can be used a consistent indicator across different 
countries even if there are different definitions and range of standards for punctuality.   
 
In Singapore, for the trial, the EWT is measured during peak and off-peak hours from 
Mondays to Fridays, excluding Public Holidays. The AM peak is defined as actual 
arrivals between 6.30am and 8.29am; AM off-peak as between 8.30am and 4.59pm; 
PM peak as between 5.00pm and 6.59pm and PM off peak as between 7.00pm and 
10.59pm. EWT is also measured across all the trips for a single bus service, and at 
VHYHUDOFULWLFDOEXVVWRSVRU³LQWHUPHGLDWHWLPLQJSRLQWV´,73V The number of ITPs 
varies by route length, with more ITPs for longer routes. EWT are also weighted 
heavier for the peak periods compared to the off-peak. Finally, EWT are averaged 
across the calendar month by direction before summation across both directions to 
obtain the overall EWT for the service for the month. 22 bus services were chosen for 
the BSRF trial because of public feedback of poor reliability. These include a mix of 
long and short trunk services as well as feeder services1. 
 
(DFKEXVVHUYLFHZLOOKDYHLWVRZQH[LVWLQJ³EDVHOLQH´(:7GHSHQGLQJRQWKHFXUUHQW
performance and the characteristics of the route. Typically, a long trunk route will 
have a higher existing baseline EWT. 7KHRSHUDWRUV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLVEHQFKPDUNHGWR
historical performance in order to ensure the reasonableness of the standards that 
operators need to comply with. A holistic measurement that assesses individual bus 
services as a whole over the entire month, and not individual bus trips at specific 
times of the day, is used in order to ensure that improvements in reliability are in fact 
sustained over the longer term. Table 1 lists the baseline EWT scores for the bus 
services covered in the initial rollout of the BSRF.  
 
Although the baseline EWT benchmarks are conceptually similar to the London MPS, 
unlike London, operators in Singapore are not allowed to curtail service, such as 
                                                          
1 Seven SMRT bus services - 176, 184, 188, 302, 858, 901 and 911 - were placed on the 
BSRF from February 2014. SBS Transit Services 17, 52, 228 and 242 were placed on the 
BSRF from 28 February 2014 and Services 3, 39, 241 and 325 from 24 March 2014. From 23 
June 2014, another seven bus services - SBS Transit Services 51, 154, 292, and 354, as well 
as SMRT Services 189, 853 and 962 - were implemented under BSRF. 
 
7 
 
short turning without penalty when there is traffic. As the operating environment is 
different in Singapore, such curtailments are not expected to be necessary and 
operators are aware of this requirement. Under the Bus Contracting Model, the 
government specifies frequency requirements for the route when calling for a tender. 
Bidders are to submit their optimised required number of vehicles for operation as 
part of their tender proposal. 
 
 
Table 1: Baseline EWT scores 
Fleet size 
category 
Operator 
Bus 
Service 
Trunk/ 
Feeder 
Length of 
Direction 1 
(km) 
Length of 
Direction 2 
(km) 
EWT 
Baseline 
(min) 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 3
  
 ?ш
 ? ?
ďƵ
ƐĞƐ
 ? SBST 
3 Trunk 19.5 20.3 1.5 
39 Trunk 26.2 26.4 1.2 
51 Trunk 37.7 36.3 2.2 
154 Trunk 32.5 34.4 1.9 
SMRT 
176 Trunk 23.5 24.4 1.6 
188 Trunk 21.6 22.1 1.4 
858a Trunk 73.4 0 2.1 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 2
  
(1
0
 t
o
 <
2
0
 b
u
se
s)
 
SBST 
17 a Trunk 25 0 1.8 
52 Trunk 25.9 25.2 2.0 
SMRT 
184 a Trunk 22.4 0 1.3 
189 a Trunk 19.8 0 1.4 
302 Feeder 7.5 0 1.0 
853 Trunk 31.1 32.3 1.5 
911 Feeder 11.8 0 1.3 
962 a Trunk 16.9 0 1.4 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 1
  
(<
 1
0
 b
u
se
s)
 
SBST 
228 Feeder 10.7 0 1.1 
241 Feeder 6.2 0 1.2 
242 Feeder 5.7 0 0.8 
292 Feeder 5.9 0 0.9 
325 Feeder 12.3 0 0.8 
354 Feeder 4.5 0 1.1 
SMRT 901 Feeder 11.8 0 0.9 
a These trunk services are loop services and therefore have no Direction 2. 
 
 
3.3 Trial of BSRF Incentive-Penalty Framework  
 
It is widely acknowledged that improving reliability or reducing EWT is operationally 
challenging. Bus operators will have to put in additional resources, such as hiring 
more service controllers to manage bus services and having standby buses to inject 
mid-route if there are delays to buses which are already en-route. The operators may 
also choose to deploy another bus if the designated bus that is scheduled to 
turnaround has been delayed on the preceding trip due to congestion. By running 
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such outside-schedule trips to maintain headway, the initiative taken by the operators 
is rewarded with a better EWT score. 
 
Hence, should significant improvements in EWT be made, incentives are provided to 
allow operators to recoup costs. These incentives are calibrated in accordance with 
the efforts and operational costs involved in improving the reliability of the services.  
The incentive-penalty framework of the BSRF is modelled after London¶VH[SHULHQFH. 
Operators are rewarded only when they achieve improvements in bus service 
regularity, and are penalised if the service is not so. 
 
Incentives and penalties are determined based on 6-month average performance of 
each service. No incentives or penalties apply in a neutral zone of ± 0.1 minutes on 
either side of the route-specific baseline EWT. Outside this neutral zone, the monthly 
incentive and penalty apply for every 0.1 minute improvement or deterioration in 
EWT score when compared to the baseline (Table 2). The ratio of incentives to 
penalties is approximately in the order of 3:2 (S$1 = US$0.75). 
 
Table 2: BSRF incentive and penalty amounts 
Fleet Size Categorya  1 (< 10 buses) 
2 
(10 to <20 buses) 
3 
EXVHV 
Incentive Amount  
per 0.1 minute 
improvement per month  
S$ 2000 
(US$1500) 
S$ 4000 
(US$3000) 
S$ 6000 
(US$4500) 
Penalty Amount  
per 0.1 minute 
deterioration per month  
S$ 1300 
(US$975) 
S$ 2600 
(US$1950) 
S$ 4000 
(US$3000) 
a This is the scheduled fleet for each bus service 
 
To allow bus operators to adjust to the new framework, for the trial, LTA granted both 
operators a transition period from 3 February until 31 May 2014 when EWTs will be 
monitored but no incentives or penalties will be applied. The transition period was 
designed to give the bus operators more time to train their bus drivers and service 
controllers and to fine tune their operational procedures to regulate bus arrival times. 
 
 
4. Evidence and Outcomes 
4.1 Stated Preference Surveys 
 
To provide some evidence on how bus users in Singapore value different aspects of 
the bus service they use, a Stated Preference (SP) component focussing specifically 
on bus waiting times was included in the wider SP study conducted in Singapore in 
2015 to elicit a number of economic measures relating to travel. The bus waiting time 
choice scenarios explicitly look at how bus users value patterns of waiting time at the 
bus stop, and hence EWT improvements and enhancements to bus service reliability.  
 
As part of the SP study, a representative cross section of the Singapore population 
were asked to record the trips they had made in the past 2 days and were then asked 
about one of these journeys in detail. They were asked to record the times and costs 
involved in making their journey and for motorised modes they were asked to provide 
similar information about their alternative mode assuming they could not make the 
journey by their current mode. This information was then used as the basis of a 
number of different sets of SP scenarios, or games. Most of the SP games were 
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within mode so respondents were presented with two options relating to their chosen 
mode. However some respondents were presented with a mode choice game where 
they chose between the different travel modes, such as car, bus, MRT, and taxi. 
 
A final sample of 791 bus users received the Bus Waiting Time game. Below we 
provide the context behind this game, an example of how the options were presented 
plus a description of the SP design issues relating to each design. These are D-
efficient designs and have been developed using Ngene. The SP presented each 
respondent with seven separate unlabelled binary choice tasks. Respondents were 
asked which of the two hypothetical options they would choose on the basis of the 
information presented. 
 
In the Bus Waiting Time SP, respondents were asked to think about the journey they 
had provided information about but imagining a situation where they had the choice 
between two future hypothetical bus services. The scheduled arrival pattern of the 
bus was shown as a reference in all games (always arriving every 10 min, depicting 
the scenario of perfect reliability) and in each game, two sets of experimentally 
generated intervals between buses were shown as hypothetical alternatives A and B. 
The bus fare they would have to pay was also shown. It was assumed that buses 
arrived IUHTXHQWO\HQRXJKWKDWWKH\³IRUJHWWKHWLPHWDEOH´LQRWKHUZRUGV
respondents were told to assume that their arrival time at the bus stop was 
completely arbitrary. Everything else about their journey remained unchanged. The 
bus fare was pivoted around the current single-trip fare reported by the respondent, 
with pivot levels of ± 30%, ± 15%, 0%, +15%, +30%. 
 
Several SP studies (see Li, Hensher, & Rose, 2010 for a review) have attempted to 
estimate the value of service reliability using presentations that rely on probabilities of 
early or late arrivals of a bus (relative to a schedule) as key attributes of the 
alternatives. In this work however, because most bus services in Singapore run at 
headways of less than 15 min and therefore do not have a posted schedule at the 
bus stop, it was not very informative to describe a bus service as experiencing 
schedule delays or of EHLQJ³HDUO\´³RQ-WLPH´RU³ODWH´Instead, we decided to opt for 
a pictorial representation of reliability based on arrival intervals, such as in Fig. 1, 
which is also consistent with how LTA has been communicating the BSRF in public 
(LTA, 2014a). Moreover, the design of the Bus Waiting Time game also allowed for 
the underlying EWT associated with each of the options to be easily calculated and 
hence, the estimation of WTP measures for EWT improvements, which was a key 
objective of the study.  
 
For the service reliability attribute, respondents were asked to consider bus arrival 
patterns over a time interval of 60 min. The scheduled arrival times, which depict the 
perfect scenario, do not vary across choice tasks and were based on a scheduled 
headway of 10 min, for a frequency of six buses per hour corresponding to six time 
intervals between arrivals. A scheduled headway of 10 min was deemed a 
reasonable assumption for the choice experiment as under the PTC QoS standards 
effective August 2009, operators are required to provide at least 80% of bus services 
at frequencies of not more than 10 minutes during weekday peak periods.  
 
For the hypothetical scenarios A and B, the design contains six interval attributes, 
each between 4 and 16 min and with a condition that the total headways sum to 60 
min in both options. The EWT in the two hypothetical alternatives ranges from 0.05 
min to 1.35 min, with an average at 0.66 min.  
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Figure 1: An example screenshot of a EWT choice experiment 
The data collected from this SP survey was next analysed using advanced discrete 
choice models. We specified the models in valuation space, such that the utility for 
alternative i would be given by  
 ௜ܸ ൌ ߚ௙௔௥௘ሺ݂ܽݎ݁௜ ൅ ܸܶܶܧܹܶ  ?ܧܹ ௜ܶሻ ൅ ߝ௜ 
 
where ߝ௜ is a type I extreme value error term, ݂ܽݎ݁௜ and ܧܹ ௜ܶ measure the fare and 
EWT of alternative i, ߚ௙௔௥௘ is an estimated fare sensitivity and VTTEWT is the 
monetary valuation of a reduction in EWT. We worked with Mixed Logit models, in 
which we allow for random heterogeneity across individual decision makers. We 
similarly estimated the correlation between willingness to pay measures and cost 
components.  
 
For distributional assumptions, we largely relied on lognormal distributions, with 
negative lognormal distributions for cost components, and positive lognormal 
distributions for willingness-to-pay measures. With the long tail of the lognormal 
distribution, a very small number of outlying values can lead to extreme valuations, 
and with this in mind, attempts at very minor censoring of the distribution were made, 
as discussed below.  
 
The resulting model structure is highly advanced and flexible, with often large 
numbers of randomly distributed coefficients, with correlation between them. The 
degree of flexibility goes beyond what has been used in many previous studies, 
where especially the estimation of the full covariance matrix leads to substantial 
gains in model flexibility. These advantages were confirmed in our empirical work, 
with large further gains in model fit and more importantly also a greater ability to 
distinguish valuations across individual journey components. 
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However, this increase in flexibility also comes at the cost of increased model 
complexity. Classical estimation techniques for Mixed Logit were found to be 
incapable of estimating these models in a stable and timely manner and we instead 
turned to Bayesian estimation. The underlying model structure is still MMNL, it is 
simply the process used to obtain estimates that changes. For a detailed discussion 
of Bayesian techniques for Mixed Logit, see Train (2009, chapter 12). In our 
Bayesian estimation, we made use of 1,000,000 burn-in iterations for each model, 
with results then obtained by averaging over 50,000 post-burn-in iterations. 
 
After model estimation, we also produced posterior estimates, thus generating for 
each individual the most likely value for the various willingness-to-pay measures as a 
function of the choices they were observed to have made (see Train, 2009, chapter 
11). These individual-specific values are then used in posterior segmentation work to 
attempt to uncover further deterministic heterogeneity. 
 
The model contains one cost component (fare) and one time component (EWT). We 
made use of a negative lognormal distribution for fare and specified the models in 
WTP space relative to fare, using a positive lognormal distribution for the valuation of 
EWT. This leads to two randomly distributed coefficients, where we estimate a full 
covariance matrix, meaning two diagonal terms (the variances of the individual utility 
components) and one off-diagonal term (the covariance between the two individual 
utility components). The estimated parameters relate to the underlying Normal 
distribution, i.e. the log of the absolute values of the coefficients (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Estimation results for the EWT choice experiment 
Parameters Estimate 
Respondents 791 
Observations 5,537 
Estimated parameters 5 
Log-likelihood -2,863.00 
DGMȡ2 0.25 
 Est. t-ratio 
Fare (underlying Normal mean for log of negative of 
coeff) 0.99 7.85 
VTT EWT (underlying Normal mean for log of coeff) -1.89 -7.13 
cov(1,1) 5.52 7.18 
cov(1,2) -8.83 -6.99 
cov(2,2) 14.24 5.98 
 
Before studying the results on the valuation of EWT in detail, two core points need to 
be made. Firstly, the ranges of EWT presented in the experiment were by definition 
very narrow, given the use of a scheduled headway of 10 min, and a maximum and 
minimum time in between bus arrival times of 4 and 16 min, respectively. This leads 
to a maximum EWT of just 1.35 min, with an average of 0.67 min. The resulting 
boundary EWT values, i.e. the trade-offs that respondents were faced with, ranged 
from 7.69c/min to 4800c/min (i.e. SGD48). This would be the valuation of EWT a 
respondent would need to have to choose the more expensive option in a given 
choice task (and hence the one with the lower EWT). The median accepted boundary 
(i.e. from choices where respondents accepted to pay more for lower EWT) was 
75c/min, while the median rejected boundary (i.e. from choices where respondents 
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refused to pay more for lower EWT) was 160c/min, with respective means of 
114.87c/min and 374.05c/min for accepted and rejected boundaries. This thus 
directly explains the high estimated value of EWT we will now turn to, which also 
needs to be put into context by noting that in practice, a one minute change in EWT 
is a major difference. 
 
For the valuation of EWT, we censored the lognormal distribution at the highest 
accepted boundary value, which was 800c/min, i.e. (SGD8). This is possible in this 
game where the choice in each scenario can be quantified by a single boundary 
value. This censoring led to a drop in log-likelihood to -2,921.65 units, i.e. a drop by 
58.65 units. This is a non-trivial drop in fit, but this approach to censoring was 
needed in this game in order to obtain reasonable results. The result average 
valuation of EWT is 71.74c/min (Table 4). This is much higher than the valuations of 
in vehicle time from the same study, and exceeds the average wage rate by a factor 
of more than two. However, the value is a realistic estimate of the real valuation, 
being very close to the median accepted boundary value, and it again needs to be 
borne in mind that achieving a minute reduction in EWT is a far bigger step than a 
minute reduction in travel time. 
 
Table 4: Implied EWT valuations 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean as % of wage rate 
Value of EWT (c/min) 71.74 144.75 238 
Wage rate from sample (SGD/hr) 18.11 
 
In our analysis of the posterior estimates, i.e. the most likely value for each 
component for each individual, we can make the following observations, where the 
small sizes for some of the subgroups need to be taken into consideration (Table 5): 
 
- There is a strong indication of higher valuation of EWT reduction on school trips, 
potentially as a result of scheduling constraints. 
- The EWT games show the strongest evidence of a meaningful income effect, 
with higher valuations for higher income respondents. 
- Surprisingly, valuations are higher for students than for other respondents, a 
finding that is difficult to explain except on the basis of a higher household 
income for their families and a perception that it is not them who pay for bus 
fares. 
- The valuation is higher for those travelling in a group. 
 
Taken together, the results will help LTA focus its bus reliability improvements 
spatially and temporally across sections of the network where such improvements 
are most likely to be valued according to the profile of bus users. 
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Table 5: Posterior analysis of EWT valuations  
 Sample size Value of EWT (c/min) 
Trip purpose 
No purpose 3 59.10 
Home-based Other 229 60.44 
Home-based School 101 90.07 
Home-based Work 297 70.69 
Not-home based 161 78.52 
Income levels 
No income 312 69.98 
Income < 2000 168 70.02 
Income 2000-4000 142 78.74 
Income 4000-7000 62 83.00 
Income > 7000 23 90.04 
Income missing or 
refused 84 56.57 
Employment status 
Work full-time, part-time 
or self-employed 469 72.31 
housewife 104 55.94 
student 128 92.46 
retired 66 48.49 
unemployed or work NA 24 82.64 
Travelling party size 
Travelled alone 646 70.45 
Travelled with others 145 77.51 
 
4.2 Commuter awareness of the BSRF 
 
While it may be argued that bus users need not be burdened with the technical 
details of the BSRF as long as they perceive an improvement in bus service 
reliability, it is important from the Government public relations perspective that the 
public attributes the significant resources expended on the scheme to the efforts of 
the Authority/regulator. In this regard, it is thought that the most salient feature of the 
BSRF to the public would be the financial incentives/penalties for operators who 
exceed/fail to meet EWT baseline measures. However, an internal Government 
survey conducted in late 2014 found that the BSRF received just low to moderate 
awareness among bus users (Figure 2).When asked how aware they were of the 
BSRF on a scale of 1 ± 5 (1 ± Not at all aware, 2 ± Slightly aware, 3 ± Somewhat 
aware, 4 ± Moderately aware, 5 ± Extremely aware), just slightly over half of the bus 
users (56 percent) were at least somewhat aware of the framework, while close to a 
third were not at all aware (32 percent). It is possible that the survey results are 
simply a reflection of the limited scale of the trial at that time and that a similar survey 
WREHFRQGXFWHGLQD\HDU¶VWLPHPD\\LHOGGLIIHUHQWUHVXOWVDVWKH%65)LVUDPSHGXS
across the island. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of respondents aware of the Bus Service Reliability Framework on 
varying degrees of awareness 
4.3 Resultant Reliability Improvements 
 
For the first assessment period of June to November 2014, the reliability of 20 out of 
the 22 bus services under trial has improved, as indicated in Table 6 (Land Transport 
Authority, 2015a). Of the bus services which improved, 18 earned incentives. The 
remaining four services had performances in the neutral zone and neither earned any 
incentive nor incurred any penalty. All trunk bus services saw improvements in EWT. 
 
Table 6: Summary of EWT improvements in first year of BSRF trial 
Fleet size 
category 
Operator 
Bus 
Service 
EWT Baseline 
(min) 
EWT for Jun to Nov 
2014 (min) 
 ?td (min) 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 3
  
 ?ш
 ? ?
ďƵ
ƐĞƐ
 ? SBST 
3 1.5 1.1 0.4 
39a 1.2 1.1 0.1 
51 2.2 1.6 0.6 
154 1.9 1.4 0.5 
SMRT 
176 1.6 1.4 0.2 
188 1.4 1.1 0.3 
858 2.1 1.8 0.3 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 2
  
(1
0
 t
o
 <
2
0
 b
u
se
s)
 
SBST 
17 1.8 1.4 0.4 
52 2.0 1.4 0.6 
SMRT 
184 1.3 1.0 0.3 
189 1.4 1.2 0.2 
853 1.5 1.0 0.5 
911a 1.3 1.4 -0.1 
962a 1.4 1.3 0.1 
C
a
te
g
o
ry
 1
  
(<
 1
0
 b
u
se
s)
 
SBST 
228 1.1 0.7 0.4 
241 1.2 1.0 0.2 
242 0.8 0.6 0.2 
292 0.9 0.7 0.2 
325 0.8 0.6 0.2 
354 1.1 0.6 0.5 
SMRT 
302a 1.0 1.0 0.0 
901 0.9 0.7 0.2 
a These services remained in the neutral zone and did not qualify for any incentive or penalty. 
32 12 24 25 7
Bus Service Reliability Framework ±
Incentives and penalties for operators to 
improve on bus service reliability
Not aware at all Slightly aware Somewhat aware Moderately aware Extremely aware
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Based on its performance over 6 months, SBST earned about S$700,000 
(US$525,000) for reliability improvements to 11 services and SMRT earned 
S$345,000 (US$259,000) for improvements to seven services. In comparison, total 
bus fare revenue by SBST and SMRT for the whole of 2014 was S$754 million 
(US$566 million) and S$218 million (US$163 million) respectively, which works out to 
be an average of S$2.7 million (US$2 million) per route. There were no penalties 
deducted from both operators for this assessment period as none of their services 
had deteriorated more than 0.1 min to fall into the penalty zone. The incentives will 
help to offset the costs incurred by the PTOs to hire the additional service controllers 
to support the BSRF. 
 
To further investigate the impact of the BSRF, we compared the daily ITP-specific 
EWT performance of a BSRF trunk route (SMRT 853) against the daily ITP-specific 
EWT of SMRT 852, a non-BSRF trunk route. SMRT 852 was chosen on the basis of 
a significant route overlap with SMRT 853 from a bus interchange in the northern part 
of the island, so that factors external to the operator, such as road, traffic and 
weather conditions, can be largely controlled for when comparing EWTs at the 
common ITP. Route diagrams of SMRT 853 and SMRT 852 with the approximate 
location of the ITP that the EWTs are based on are shown in Appendix 1. 
 
A before and after comparison relative to the start of the incentive-penalty regime in 
-XQHVKRZVWKDW6057¶V(:7KDVGHFUHDVHGE\DERXWPLQXWHVZKLOH
6057¶V(:7KDVLQFUHDVHGE\WKHVDme magnitude (Table 7). Table 7 also 
reports a simple difference-in-difference analysis of the EWT of SMRT 852 relative to 
the EWT of SMRT 853 on a monthly basis from January 2014, suggesting that BSRF 
has helped to improve the reliability of SMRT 853, after controlling for changes in 
operating conditions that are proxied by the EWT scores of SMRT 852. 
Improvements were detectable from April 2014 onwards, such that by November of 
the same year, the EWT difference for SMRT 852 and SMRT 853 has widened by 
0.7 minutes from the January baseline. These are encouraging indications for the 
BSRF trial in general. 
 
The success of the BSRF trial in its first year may be attributed to operators injecting 
additional resources required to monitor and improve en-route reliability, such as 
having more standby buses and drivers, as well as employing more service 
controllers to communicate with drivers and manage bus movement. The surpassing 
of standards in most of the assessed bus services does not indicate low baseline 
standards but rather the concerted efforts of operators to improve reliability of 
services under BSRF. Likewise, there were services that did not improve despite 
operators putting in their best efforts to manage these services. With these and 
subsequent findings from the trial, LTA will continue to fine-tune the framework over 
time. 
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Table 7: Before-and-after EWT comparisons of a selected pair of BSRF/non-BSRF bus 
routes 
 SMRT 853 SMRT 852 Dependent variable: (EWT852  W  EWT853)t 
Average EWT from 
Jan to May 2014 
before 
Incentive/Penalty 
Start Date 
 
0.81 0.89 
Constant 
ʹ0.25*** 
(0.094) 
(0,1) variable for Feb 
0.18 
(0.14) 
(0,1) variable for Mar 
0.32 
(0.17) 
(0,1) variable for Apr 
0.56*** 
(0.12) 
(0,1) variable for May 
0.52*** 
(0.12) 
Average EWT from 
Jul to Nov 2014 
after 
incentive/Penalty 
Start Date 
 
0.71 1.01 
(0,1) variable for Jul 
0.57*** 
(0.14) 
(0,1) variable for Aug 
0.74*** 
(0.14) 
(0,1) variable for Sep 
0.42*** 
(0.14) 
(0,1) variable for Oct 
0.35** 
(0.14) 
(0,1) variable for Nov 
0.70*** 
(0.149) 
Difference in EWT 
(After ʹ Before) 
ʹ0.10** 
(0.045) 
0.12* 
(0.063) 
Adj R2 0.15 
No. of observations 202 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper provides an overview of various mechanisms used by regulators to 
measure and improve bus service reliability standards, with a particular emphasis on 
the approach that Singapore has taken. From an empirical and methodological 
perspective, another significant contribution of this paper is the estimation of 
willingness-to-pay measures for EWT improvements, the results of which will be 
useful from a policy perspective in helping to determine a commensurate level of 
effort and resources to be expended on improving bus reliability. 
 
Overall, the BSRF trial in Singapore has yielded promising results to date with a 
majority of bus services under the trial notching improvements in their EWT scores. 
In June 2015, LTA announced that the number of bus services on the BSRF trial 
would be doubled to 45, and that the trial would be extended from February to 
August 2016 (Land Transport Authority, 2015b). LTA also announced that a new 
indicator, on-time adherence2, which is used to measure the punctuality of bus 
services, will be trialled for two low frequency services. Eventually, LTA intends to 
bring all bus services under the BSRF through the Bus Contracting Model. During the 
tendering process, EWT baseline standards for each bus service are clearly 
                                                          
2 On-time adherence (OTA) is the percentage of arrivals at selected bus stops that are within 
a -2 min/+5 min range of the scheduled arrival time. The OTA target is currently set at 85%. 
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stipulated in contractual documents, which tenderers have to consider when planning 
their timetables.  
 
:LWKWKHVWDUWRIRSHUDWLRQVE\7RZHU7UDQVLW6LQJDSRUH¶VWKLUGEXVRSHUDWRURQ
May 2016, 6LQJDSRUH¶s new Bus Contracting Model provides avenues for further 
research into how contract specifications and the injection of greater competition 
advance the improvement and implementation of reliability standards across the bus 
network. It would be interesting for example to study if there are varying degrees of 
success among the various operators (incumbents and new entrants) in terms of 
running more reliable bus services, and the factors that distinguish operators from 
each other. Amid rising commuter expectations and with a major push by the 
Government to provide better service and make public transport a choice mode, the 
emphasis on improving reliability through the introduction of new measures and 
regulatory frameworks could not come at a more opportune time. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A.2 Route diagrams of SMRT 853 and 852 
 
 
